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ABSTRACT 
 
Core intuitions about persons co-exist and interfere with acquired Christian beliefs about God 
 
By 
 
Michael Barlev 
 
In three experiments, using a novel sentence verification paradigm, we tested the hypothesis 
that acquired Christian beliefs about God which are inconsistent with core intuitions about 
persons co-exist with, rather than replace, those intuitions in the minds of religious believers. 
Participants were asked to evaluate a series of statements for which core intuitions and 
acquired religious beliefs were consistent (i.e. true according to both [e.g. “God has beliefs 
that are true”] or false according to both [e.g. “all beliefs God has are false”]) or inconsistent 
(i.e. true on intuition but false theologically [e.g. “God has beliefs that are false”] or false on 
intuition but true theologically [e.g. “all beliefs God has are true”]). Participants (1) were less 
accurate and took longer to respond to the inconsistent statements, suggesting that core 
intuitions both co-exist alongside and interfere with acquired religious beliefs (Experiments 1 
and 2), (2) were disproportionately more likely to make errors on the inconsistent statements 
when responding under time pressure than when responding with no time pressure, 
suggesting that the resolution of conflicts between inconsistent co-existing beliefs requires 
cognitive resources (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 ruled-out a plausible alternative 
interpretation of these results. 
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1 Introduction 
The tendency to attribute supernatural entities (e.g. gods, spirits, ancestor spirits, and 
divine beings) with person-like characteristics is widespread among present and past human 
cultures; indeed, it is noted in writings dating as far back as ancient Greece (Boyer, 1994a, b; 
2001). However, it was only with relatively recent theoretical advances in evolutionary 
psychology and cognitive science that this tendency could be explained via the evolved, 
universal information processing architecture of the human mind: supernatural entities are 
attributed with person-like characteristics because just like representations of persons they 
are formed by co-opting the evolved person concept (also referred to as a “person template”; 
e.g. Boyer, 2001; Boyer & Ramble, 2001). The person concept consists of default inferences 
about persons, such as about their physicality, biology, and psychology which reliably 
develop from a skeletal set of inferences about persons present in infancy and from 
associated learning adaptations (e.g. Carey, 2009; Baillargeon, Scott, & Bian, 2015 for recent 
reviews). 
However, supernatural entities are also believed to have characteristics inconsistent 
with default inferences about persons. The exact characteristics depend on the supernatural 
entity and the theological tradition; for example, while persons are intuitively believed to 
have limited perceptual and mental abilities, in all mainstream Christian denominations God 
is believed to be omniscient (Boyer, 1994a,b, 2001; Boyer & Ramble, 2001). In this study we 
investigate the hypothesis by Sperber and colleagues (Sperber, 1985, 1996, 1997, 2000; 
Mercier & Sperber, 2009; also see Boyer 1994a, b, 2001; Barrett & Keil, 1996; Barrett, 1998, 
1999) according to which characteristics attributed to supernatural entities which are 
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inconsistent with default inferences about persons (1) do not replace these inferences, but (2) 
co-exist with them in the minds of religious believers.1 
 
1.1 Previous Research 
A variety of studies utilizing self-report methodologies have explored the 
psychological, physiological, and physical attributions children and adults make about God, 
concluding that both are quite willing to attribute certain human characteristics, specifically 
mental states, to God (e.g. Gray, Gray & Wegner, 2007; Shtulman, 2008; Shtulman & 
Lindeman, 2015; Lane, Wellman, & Evans, 2010, 2012, 2014) – indeed, often their own 
mental states (Epley, Converse, Delbosc, Monteleone, & Cacioppo, 2009) – and that in adults 
individual difference variables such as attachment style are associated with different mental 
state attributions (e.g. Granqvist & Kirkpatrick, 2008; Kirkpatrick, 2005). 
Although these findings are consistent with the co-existence hypothesis they are also 
consistent with two alternatives: First, many adults might not have acquired the relevant 
theology and might not fully know which characteristics God is assumed to have. For 
example, Lane, Wellman, & Evans (2014) find a developmental progression in children’s 
differentiation of God and persons supportive of this interpretation: elementary school 
                                                 
1 Sperber and colleagues further hypothesize that (3) acquired beliefs that are inconsistent with core intuitions 
exist in a specialized meta-representational “bubble” which isolates them from core concepts which exist in a 
mental data-base of beliefs; in contrast to the data-base of beliefs which can be accessed unconsciously and 
spontaneously, meta-representations can only be accessed consciously (e.g. Sperber, 1997, 2000; Mercier & 
Sperber, 2009; for a related discussion of dual-process theory see Evans, 2003, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; 
also see Mercier & Sperber, 2011). We do not investigate this issue which, while interesting, is beyond the 
scope of the experiments reported here. 
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children but not preschoolers differentiate between the mental and perceptual capacities of 
persons and God, but nonetheless attribute only partial omniscience to God, and it is not until 
late adolescence that God is attributed with full omniscience. Additionally, Lane, Wellman, 
& Evans (2012) find that religiously schooled preschoolers differentiate between the 
capacities of persons and God earlier than secularly schooled preschoolers. In order to 
control for this alternative, the current study includes only those characteristics that are 
intuitively attributed to persons but theologically withheld from God which most religious 
believers from the population recruited from are likely to be familiar with. For example, the 
findings by Lane, Wellman, & Evans (2014) suggest that by late adolescence to early 
adulthood religious believers are familiar with theological notions of God’s omniscience; the 
findings by Barrett & Keil (1996) suggest that by the same age religious believers and non-
believers are familiar with a variety of theological notions pertaining to Gods psychology, 
perception, and physicality. 
Second, many adults might have acquired the relevant theology but nonetheless 
intentionally deviate from it by attributing certain characteristics to God. For example, in her 
ethnographic study of Evangelical Christians in Chicago and the Bay Area anthropologist 
Tanya Luhrmann found that many of her informants attributed person-like mental states to 
God so as to, they reported, be able to experience God more closely and intimately 
(Luhrmann, 2012). But, when pressed, the informants would acknowledge that their 
attributions deviated from the theology of their group. In order to control for intentional 
deviations from theology that can occur in self-reported beliefs, the current study includes 
measures of beliefs not susceptible to intentional deviation. 
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The primary line of research satisfying the above requirements to have investigated 
the co-existence hypothesis (which is there termed “theological incorrectness”) is the studies 
of memory confusions in religious adults by Barrett and colleagues (Christian adults in 
Barrett & Keil, 1996; Hindu adults in Barrett, 1998). For example, in Barrett & Keil (1996) 
participants asked to recall narratives such as about God intervening to answer a prayer were 
shown to mistakenly add physical or psychological limitations to God’s actions not present in 
the original narratives (e.g. that to intervene God has to finish answering another prayer or 
stop another action such as helping an angel work on a crossword puzzle) and which are 
inconsistent with the participants’ self-reported theological beliefs. The authors interpreted 
these memory confusions as showing that participants represented God via the agent concept, 
and in recalling the narrative were mistakenly relying on default intuitions about persons 
(e.g. sequential action). 
However, the studies by Barrett and colleagues have themselves been critiqued on 
other grounds by other scholars. One major objection is that a person-like representation of 
God was implied in the narratives themselves (e.g. Shtulman, 2008)2. As Shtulman notes: 
“God was described in other stories as pushing a large stone, looking at the rock, 
listening to the birds, enjoying the smell, and helping an angel work on a crossword puzzle. 
Any participants who might have disagreed with the anthropomorphic implications of these 
statements were still required to reason on their basis. To these participants, stories about a 
looking, listening, helping God would be as incongruent with their personal beliefs as stories 
                                                 
2 A similar objection whereby the task implies that God is person-like – or, specifically, has a physical body – 
has been raised by Hyde (1990) toward studies in which children are asked to draw an image of God. 
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about a looking, listening, helping teapot, yet one could hardly fault them for drawing 
anthropomorphic inferences consistent with the stories’ premises.” 
Shtulman (2008) considers it plausible that this language may have contributed to the 
person concept based responses seen in the recall of the narrative in the Barrett & Keil (1996) 
and Barrett (1998) studies.3  
 
1.2 The Current Study 
The primary goal of the current study is to provide a novel test of the co-existence 
hypothesis in religious beliefs, specifically beliefs about God among Christian religious 
believers. The methodology used is the sentence verification task employed by Shtulman & 
Valcarcel (2012)4 which consists of an overt measure of response accuracy, and a covert 
measure of response time, with the latter providing the necessary control for intentional 
deviations from theology mentioned in section 1.1. In the task participants are required to 
                                                 
3 A second objection raised by Shtulman concerns the overall rate of anthropomorphic responding in the studies 
by Barrett and colleagues for narratives involving religious agents, which he points out was (1) lower than 
100%, and (2) not substantially different from the rate of anthropomorphic responding observed for narratives 
involving a supercomputer (a non-religious agents with full information access; ibid. p. 1125). However, a 
problem with evaluating this objection is that there is no consensus on what amount of anthropomorphism – 
beyond demonstrating that it exists – is required to support the co-existence hypothesis, or how minimal such 
responding needs to be to refute it. 
 
4 Shtulman & Valcarcel used this methodology to study a parallel case of the co-existence of early- and later-
acquired scientific beliefs (see also: Bloom & Skolnick-Weisberg, 2007; Goldberg & Thompson-Schill, 2009; 
Kelemen & Rossett, 2009; Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston, 2012; Legare & Gelman, 2008; Shtulman, 2006; 
Shtulman & Valcarel, 2012). 
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endorse or reject statements of two broad kinds: consistent statements that were true or false 
according to both intuition and theology (e.g. “God has beliefs that are true”; “All beliefs 
God has are false”), and inconsistent statements that were either true intuitively but false 
theologically (e.g. “God has beliefs that are false”) or false intuitively but true theologically 
(e.g. “All beliefs God has are true”). 
As per the outline of the person concept in the introduction, intuitive beliefs about 
both the physicality and psychology of persons were derived from reliably developing default 
inferences about persons that have been well established by extensive research with infants 
and toddlers (e.g. Carey, 2009; Baillargeon, Scott, & Bian, 2015). Acquired religious beliefs 
were derived from formal Christian theology that is shared between the Christian religious 
denominations with which the participants recruited for this study identified (primarily 
Catholics and Charismatic Christians in Experiment 1, and Catholics and Protestants in 
Experiments 2 and 3), and that previous surveys of Christian religious believers suggested 
our participants would be familiar with. The statements used in the study were additionally 
reviewed by theological officials at the churches from which participants were recruited, who 
confirmed that participants would have been exposed to and plausibly acquired the 
theological beliefs from which the statements were derived. 
The current study examined four predictions which follow from the co-existence 
hypothesis: 
(1) If core intuitions co-exist with acquired beliefs which are inconsistent with them 
then they might also interfere with those beliefs, and this interference might cause 
inconsistent statements to be responded to less accurately and more slowly than consistent 
statements.  In principle co-existence is possible without interference, but since interference 
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necessarily requires co-existence, to demonstrate interference would also be to demonstrate 
co-existence. The first prediction therefore aims to support and extend the co-existence 
hypothesis as demonstrated for scientific beliefs (e.g. Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012) to the 
domain of religious beliefs. 
(2) If acquired religious and scientific beliefs and inconsistent core intuitions are in 
conflict (e.g. Barrett & Keil, 1996; Barrett, 1998, 1999; Kelemen & Rossett, 2009; Kelemen, 
Rottman, & Seston, 2012) then it is plausible that there are cognitive mechanisms involved in 
resolving this conflict. Previous findings suggest that when participants are put under time 
pressure their tendency to make erroneous intuitive teleological attributions is increased (e.g. 
Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston, 2012). Therefore, we predicted that 
when put under time pressure participants would show a decrease in accuracy on inconsistent 
statements more so than on consistent statements. In both Experiments 1 and 2 a subset of 
participants were therefore pseudo-randomly assigned to conditions utilizing speeding 
manipulations. In Experiment 1 a subset of participants were assigned to a speeded 
instructions condition where they were encouraged to respond quickly, while the remaining 
subset received the task with no such encouragement (unspeeded instructions condition). In 
Experiment 2 a subset of participants were assigned to a speeded responding condition where 
a time limit was set on responses, while the remaining subset received the task with no such 
time limit (unspeeded responding condition). 
(3) Kelemen & Rossett (2009) propose that inhibitory mechanisms might be 
employed to suppress certain types of teleological attributions, and found that a measure of 
inhibitory control (the behavioral Stroop task), was one predictor of scientific accuracy on 
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such responses.5 Similarly, Lindeman & Aarnio (2007) argue that ontological confusions 
based on intuition are central to paranormal beliefs, and there is recent evidence that the 
tendency to make such confusions is related to individual differences in the efficiency of 
inhibitory mechanisms (Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013; see also Lindeman, Reikki, & Hood, 
2011). If inhibitory resources are the mechanism which inhibits inconsistent intuitions from 
interfering with acquired beliefs then it is plausible that individual differences in inhibition, 
as indexed by the behavioral Stroop task (Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Kelemen, Rottman, & 
Seston, 2012; Lindeman, Reikki, & Hood, 2011; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013), rather than 
other executive functions such as working memory (Broadway & Engel, 2010; Redick et al., 
2012), would be related to performance on the sentence verification task. 
(4) We consider it unlikely that any amount of practice with acquired beliefs could 
replace inconsistent intuitions (e.g. see Goldberg & Thompson-Schill, 2009, for evidence of 
“childhood animism” with biology professors, and Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston, 2012, for 
evidence of teleological intuitions science professors), but it is plausible that practice could 
attenuate interference from inconsistent intuitions. We therefore predicted that individual 
differences in practice with acquired religious and scientific beliefs (indexed with measures 
of religion and science education) would be related to performance on the sentence 
verification task. 
A secondary goal of the current study was to conduct a full replication of the 
Shtulman & Valcarel (2012) experiment assessing the co-existence of early- and later-
                                                 
5 Kelemen & Rossett (2009) distinguish between 'implicitly' held teleological biological beliefs, where 
participants would need to inhibit a tendency to endorse statements of such beliefs to be correct, from 
'explicitly' held teleological biological beliefs, where (incorrect) endorsements would happen because people 
explicitly hold those beliefs, with no inhibition being deployed (Experiment 2, pp 141-142).  
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acquired scientific beliefs. In the current climate of concern over the replicability of findings 
across science, but especially in psychological science (Ioannidis, 2005; Nosek & Lakens, 
2014; see also other papers in that special issue), undertaking replications of existing findings 
alongside attempted extensions is one valuable additional tool available to the psychological 
scientific community that might eventually offset the problem of (lack of) replication. 
Accordingly, the new religion statements were intermixed in the current study with the entire 
set of science statements used by Shtuman & Valcarel (2012) so as to determine if that result 
replicated, albeit in a different design context. It was predicted that the same pattern of 
findings would emerge. 
 
2.0 Experiment 1 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants 
 Participants were 44 university students (56% female), ranging in age from 18 to 24 
(M = 20), and drawn from two different samples: (1) two local churches, one Catholic and 
one Charismatic, that serve an almost exclusively college-aged population (these participants 
were paid for their time), and (2) the psychology participant pool at a university in Southern 
California (these participants received class credit). Fifty four percent of participants 
identified as White, 25% identified as Hispanic or Latino, and 20% identified as Asian. 
All participants were pre-selected according to the following criteria, meant to ensure 
primary exposure to and belief in only one religion: they needed to have been brought up 
within the same Christian denomination with which they currently identify, and to identify as 
religious believers (indexed as a minimum rating of “slightly religious” on a one-item 
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religiosity question). Five participants did not match these criteria, despite the initial pre-
selection, and were not included in the final sample (N=39), who were assigned pseudo-
randomly to receive the task under speeded instructions (N=19) or unspeeded instructions 
(N=20).   
 Of the final sample fifty percent of participants identified as Roman Catholic, 41% 
identified as simply “Christian”, and 9% identified as one of a number of Protestant Christian 
denominations (e.g. Baptist, Lutheran). Since Charismatic Christians don’t usually associate 
with a specific Christian denomination it is likely that many of the participants who identified 
themselves as "Christian” in this sample were Charismatic Christians. In support of this, 
many participants who identified as “Christian” in this sample also reported being affiliated 
with the local Charismatic church. On a 4-point Likert scale (range 0 to 3; Not at all, Slightly, 
Moderately, Very), participants on average reported being moderately religious (M = 2.20, 
SD = .83) and moderately spiritual (M = 2.01, SD = .87), and the two were highly correlated 
(r = .522, p = .001).  
 
2.1.2 Design 
 The primary dependent variable was response accuracy, and with respect to this 
dependent variable, the design was a 2 (Domain: Religion versus Science) x 2 (Consistency: 
Consistent versus Inconsistent) x 2 (Instructions: Speeded versus Unspeeded) factorial with 
within-subjects repeated measures on the first two factors.  
 Response time data were also collected for participants in the speeded instructions 
condition. For this dependent variable the design was a 2 (Domain: Religion versus Science) 
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x 2 (Consistency: Consistent versus Inconsistent) factorial with within-subjects repeated 
measures. 
 
2.1.3 Materials 
The religion statements were constructed in groups of four statements, with each 
group targeting a particular physical or psychological limitation that is typically attributed to 
persons but withheld from God in reflective Christian theology. For example, one group of 
statements concerned God’s beliefs (assumed to be always true), while another concerned the 
necessity of communication for God to obtain information (God is assumed to know the 
contents of prayers without those needing to be communicated), and another concerned the 
necessity for God to have a physical body to act on the world (God is assumed not to have a 
physical body and not to require a physical body to act on the world). For each group, a pair 
of consistent and inconsistent statements was constructed such that there was one that was 
true on both intuition and theology, one that was true on neither, one that was true only on 
intuition, and one that was true only on theology. There were 12 groups of 4 statements each, 
for a total of 48 statements. Example statements appear in Table 1, and a full list of all 
religion statements can be found in the Appendix. 
Following Shtulman & Valcarcel (2012) there were an equal number of statements 
that were objectively true and false to deter response strategies, and the four statements 
within each group were balanced in terms of overall sentence structure, complexity, and 
length in words. 
The science statements used were the same 200 statements used by Shtulman & 
Valcarcel, covering 10 areas of mathematics and science (astronomy, evolution, fractions, 
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genetics, germs, matter, mechanics, physiology, thermodynamics, and waves). Example 
statements appear in Table 1, and a full list of all science statements can be found in the 
Appendix. 
 
 
 
Additional materials included (1) a 144-item behavioral Stroop task which included 
the following three conditions (48 items per condition): Congruent (the words RED, BLUE, 
GREEN, and YELLOW appearing in red, blue, green, and yellow color, respectively), 
Incongruent (the words RED, BLUE, GREEN, and YELLOW appearing in a color different 
Table 1
Sample Statements from the Domains of Religion and Science.
Intuition Reflection Religion Statements Science Statements
Consistent
T T God has beliefs that are true. Rocks are composed of matter.
F F All beliefs God has are false. Numbers are composed of matter.
Inconsistent
T F God has beliefs that are false. Fire is composed of matter.
F T All beliefs God has are true. Air is composed of matter.
Consistent
T T God can hear what I say out loud. People turn food into energy.
F F God can't hear what I say out loud. Rocks turn food into energy.
Inconsistent
T F God can't hear what I say to myself. Plants turn food into energy.
F T God can hear what I say to myself. Bacteria turn food into energy.
Consistent
T T God knows what I want and what I pray for. Humans are descended from tree-dwelling creatures.
F F Even if I pray for it, God won't know what I want. Humans are descended from plants.
Inconsistent
T F God won't know what I want unless I pray for it. Humans are descended from chimpanzees.
F T God will know what I want even if I don't pray for it. Humans are descended from sea-dwelling creatures.
Consistent
T T God can see people's actions. A moving bullet loses speed.
F F God can't see people's actions. A moving bullet loses weight.
Inconsistent
T F God needs eyes to see. A moving bullet loses force.
F T God can see without eyes. A moving bullet loses height.
Note. Statements that are true both intuitively and reflectively are considered consistent; statements that are true on one and false on the other are considered 
inconsistent. Science statements are from Shtulman & Valcarcel (2012).
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than the one they spell), and Neutral (the words LOT, SHIP, KNIFE, FLOWER – length-
matched and frequency-matched to the color words, appearing in colors); a Stroop response 
time interference score is then calculated by subtracting the mean response time on the 
neutral condition from the mean response time on the incongruent condition, (2) a running 
span working memory task (Broadway & Engel, 2010), and (3) a short survey seeking 
demographic information, measures of both self-reported religiosity and spirituality, extent of 
participants’ religious education (measured as frequency of monthly attendance at Church 
and as years of formal religious education), and extent of math and science education 
(measured by asking participants to list all math and science courses taken in college). 
 
2.1.4 Procedure 
In a quiet testing room, groups of up to 6 participants took the experiment at semi-
private computer testing stations. Participants in both the speeded and unspeeded instructions 
conditions completed, in this order, the sentence verification task, the behavioral Stroop task, 
the working memory task, and the survey. In the speeded instructions condition the 
instructions to the sentence verification task emphasized both response accuracy and speed 
(in multiple parts of the instructions participants were told to “respond as quickly as you can, 
while making as few mistakes as you can” and that “speed and accuracy are both very 
important”), and responses were collected via key presses to facilitate faster and less 
deliberate responding (presented via E-Prime software). In the unspeeded instructions 
condition the instructions emphasized accuracy only, and responses were presented in survey 
form (presented via Qualtrics software) to facilitate slower and more deliberate responding. 
In both instructions conditions the sentence verification task items were presented one-by-
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one and in a randomized order, and whether the right or left hand were used to respond “true” 
or “false” was randomized between participants. 
 
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Sentence response accuracy 
  The primary hypothesis under test was that participants will be more accurate 
responding to items in which core intuitions are consistent with acquired beliefs in the 
domains of religion and science. The sentence response accuracy data were subjected to a 2 
(Domain: religion versus science) X 2 (Consistency: consistent versus inconsistent) X 2 
(Instructions: unspeeded versus speeded) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
repeated measures on the first two factors, revealing main effects of Domain (F 1, 37 = 348.7, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .90) and Consistency (F 1, 37 = 226.2, p < .001, partial η
2 = .86) qualified 
by an interaction between Domain and Consistency (F 1, 37 = 50.5, p < .001, partial η
2 = .58). 
There was no main effect of Instructions, and the Instructions factor did not enter into any 
two- or three-way interactions (all Fs < 1.3, all ps = n.s.). With no main effect of Instructions 
and no interactions involving the Instructions factor, no further analyses involving it are 
reported. The interaction between Domain and Consistency is shown for both instructions 
conditions in Figure 1. 
Simple main effect analyses confirmed that participants performed better on the 
religion items than on the science items for both the consistent (M religion = 98.10%, SD religion 
= 4.26% versus M science = 84.28%, SD science = 5.70%; t (38) = 12.42, p < .001, d = 2.75) and 
inconsistent items (M religion = 89.32%, SD religion = 9.97% versus M science = 62.23%, SD science 
= 9.51%; t (38) = 15.93, p < .001, d = 2.78), and that the interaction resulted from the size of 
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the effect for consistency being more than twice as large for the science items (M consistent = 
84.28%, SD consistent = 5.70%; versus M inconsistent = 62.23%, SD inconsistent = 9.51%; t (38) = 
16.90, p < .001, d = 2.81) than for the religion items (M consistent = 98.10%, SD consistent = 
4.26%; versus M inconsistent = 89.32%, SD inconsistent = 9.97%; t (38) = 6.06, p < .001, d = 1.15).
 6 
These results support our first prediction by replicating and extending the findings of 
Shtulman & Valcarel (2012) to show that there is a similar conflict between core intuitions 
and acquired beliefs in the domain of religion. However, our second prediction that the 
difference in response accuracies between consistent and inconsistent items would be greater 
under instruction to respond quickly was not supported. 
 
                                                 
6 Shapiro-Wilk tests revealed that several of the response accuracy distributions were not normal (consistent 
religion items in the unspeeded instructions condition: SW = .455, df = 20, p < .001; consistent and inconsistent 
religion items in the speeded instructions condition: SW = .599, df = 19, p < .001, SW = .681, df = 19, p < .001, 
respectively). The simple main effects were therefore analyzed with non-parametric tests to supplement the 
parametric tests reported here. A series of planned comparisons using the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test 
confirmed all findings reported here (all Zs < -4.83, all ps < .001). 
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2.2.2 Sentence response time7 
Sentence response time data were collected for those participants who received 
speeded instructions. Response time data for correct responses were entered into a 2 
(Domain; Religion versus Science) X 2 (Consistency; Consistent versus Inconsistent) 
repeated measures ANOVA, revealing a main effect of Consistency only (F 1, 19 = 40.88, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .68). There was no main effect of Domain and no interaction (both Fs < 1.0, 
                                                 
7 A very small number of response time data points (<1%) were removed for being more than 3SD beyond the 
mean response time of any given participant. 
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ps = n.s.). Simple main effect analyses confirmed that participants were faster on the 
consistent items than they were on the inconsistent items for both religion items (M consistent  = 
2972ms, SD consistent  = 703ms versus M inconsistent  = 3219ms, SD consistent  = 765ms), F 1, 19 = 
11.58, p < .005, d = 0.34) and science items (M consistent  = 2971ms, SD consistent  = 505ms versus 
M inconsistent  = 3298ms, SD consistent  = 563ms), F 1, 19 = 29.55, p < .001, d = 0.61), and that there 
were no differences in response times between science and religion items for either 
consistent (M religion  = 2972ms, SD religion  = 703ms versus M science  = 2971ms, SD consistent  = 
505ms), or inconsistent items (M religion  = 3219ms, SD religion  = 765ms versus M science  = 
3298ms, SD consistent  = 563ms), both Fs < 1.0, ps = n.s.). 
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2.2.3 Associations with measures of executive functions 
The inhibition measure (Stroop response time interference scores: M = 81ms, SD = 
76ms, for correct responses only) along with the working memory measure (M = 25.62, SD = 
12.26) were entered into a correlational analysis with interference scores on accuracy (both 
speeded and unspeeded instructions) and response time (speeded instructions only) on the 
sentence verification task for both the religion and science items, calculated as the difference 
between the consistent and inconsistent conditions. In this way accuracy on the consistent 
condition serves as a baseline index of familiarity with the domain under consideration and 
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the response time serves as a baseline index of response rate in the domain. Lower scores for 
response accuracy and higher scores for response time on the inconsistent condition serve as 
the index of the degree of interference of intuitions on acquired beliefs. Neither of the two 
executive functions measures were correlated with either the accuracy or response time 
interference scores in either the religion or science domains (all ps = n.s.). 
 
2.2.4 Associations with measures of education 
Participants were assigned an education composite score, calculated by summing the 
number of content areas – mathematics, biology, chemistry, and physics – they have taken at 
least one course in. The composite education variable ranged from 1 to 4 (M = 2.69, SD = 
1.00), and did not correlate with either the accuracy (both speeded and unspeeded 
instructions) or response time (speeded instructions only) interference scores for science 
items (both ps = n.s.). Shtulman & Valcarcel similarly collected data on the math and science 
courses their participants have taken, and using a slightly different variable (total number of 
courses taken, rather than the composite score for content areas used here) similarly did not 
find that it predicted any of the effects reported in their study. 
Two dichotomous measures of religious education were considered: regular monthly 
attendance at Church (66% of participants reported attending church at least once a month), 
and theology study (42% of participant reported having studied theology). A one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that regular monthly attendance at church did not 
predict either the accuracy (both speeded and unspeeded instructions) or response time 
(speeded instructions only) interference scores for religion items (both Fs < 2.5, both ps = 
n.s.). However, participants who regularly attended church were overall more accurate on 
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both consistent (M = 99.17%, SD = 2.30% versus M = 94.55%, SD = 6.97%; F 1, 37 = 10.01, p 
< .01, partial η2 = .22) and inconsistent (M consistent = 90.83%, SD consistent = 7.61% versus M 
inconsistent = 84.26%, SD inconsistent = 15.00%; F 1, 37 = 3.18, p = .08, partial η
2 = .08) religion 
items. 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) additionally revealed that having studied 
theology predicted a lower accuracy interference score (both speeded and unspeeded 
instructions) for religion items (M religion = 6.29%, SD religion = 5.59% versus M religion = 
12.01%, SD religion = 11.59%; F 1, 37 = 4.13, p < .05, partial η
2 = .10); it did not predict the 
response time interference score (speeded instructions only) for religion items (F < 2.5, p = 
n.s.). 
 
3.0 Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 failed to find an effect of instructions to respond quickly on the 
sentence verification task: participants responded with almost identical levels of accuracy 
under speeded and unspeeded instructions. The lack of an effect for the instructions 
manipulation in the current study is not critical for evaluating the co-existence hypothesis, 
particularly given the strong effects of consistency on response accuracy and speed. Indeed, 
in Kelemen & Rosset (2009) and Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston (2012) there is evidence of 
co-existence of teleological thinking alongside scientific thinking at the slowest response 
rates imposed (e.g. in the unspeeded condition in the two experiments reported in Kelemen & 
Rosset endorsements of teleological explanations range from 29 to 42% versus 47 to 54% in 
their speeded condition).  
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The most likely explanation for this outcome is that instructions to respond quickly 
alone were not a strong enough manipulation to put participants under time pressure in the 
speeded instructions condition. In some previous studies that used a speeding manipulation, 
instructions to respond quickly were accompanied by time limits on participants’ response 
windows (e.g. Kelemen & Rossett, 2009, Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston, 2012; Lindeman, 
Reikki & Hood, 2011; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013). In Experiment 2, therefore, response 
time limits were added to the speeding manipulation to further investigate the prediction 
concerning stressing executive resources derived from the co-existence hypothesis. 
 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants 
Participants were 75 university students (80% female), ranging in age from 18 to 24 
(M = 19), and drawn from the psychology participant pool at a university in Southern 
California. All participants received class credit for their time. Thirty eight percent of 
participants identified as White, 29% identified as Hispanic or Latino, and 29% identified as 
Asian, and 4% identified as “Other”. 
As in experiment 1 all participants were pre-selected according to criteria meant to 
ensure primary exposure to and belief in only one religious tradition (see Experiment 1 for 
details). Four participants did not match these criteria, despite the initial pre-selection, and 
were not included in the final sample (N = 71), who were assigned pseudo-randomly to 
receive the task under time limit (N = 32) or no time limit (N = 39). 
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 Of the final sample forty percent of participants identified as Roman Catholic, 39% 
identified as non-denominational Christian8, and 21% identified as one of a number of 
Protestant Christian denominations (e.g. Presbyterian, Baptist). On a 4-point Likert scale 
(range 0 to 3) participants on average reported being moderately religious (M = 1.93, SD = 
.64) and moderately spiritual (M = 1.83, SD = .83), and the two were highly correlated (r = 
.571, p < .001). 
 
3.1.2 Design 
 As in Experiment 1 the primary dependent variable was response accuracy, and a 
secondary dependent variable was response time which was collected for participants in both 
conditions. The design was a 2 (Domain: Religion versus Science) x 2 (Consistency: 
Consistent versus Inconsistent) x 2 (Condition: time limit versus no time limit on responding) 
factorial design with within-subjects repeated measures on the first two factors. 
 
3.1.3 Materials 
The materials used were identical to those used in Experiment 1 with the exception of 
the behavioral Stroop task which was modified to resemble the task used by Lindeman, 
Reikki & Hood (2011) and Svedholm & Lindeman (2013). The “congruent” condition was 
replaced with a “color-naming” condition in which a string of Xs appears in red, blue, green, 
or yellow color and participants are required to respond to the color in which the Xs appear, 
and the “neutral” condition was replaced with a “word-naming” condition in which the words 
                                                 
8 Unlike in Experiment 1 where most of the participants who identified as “Christian” reported being affiliated 
with the local Charismatic church none of the participants who identified as “Christian” in this experiment did. 
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RED, BLUE, GREEN, and YELLOW appear in black, and participants are required to 
respond to the word that appears. The “incongruent” condition (the words RED, BLUE, 
GREEN, and YELLOW appearing in a color different than the one they spell) remained the 
same. A Stroop response time interference score is then calculated by subtracting response 
times on the color-naming condition from the incongruent condition. The word-naming 
condition is not used in calculations; it is meant to discourage a response strategy whereby 
participants might only attend to the color in which a word appears by either directing their 
gaze to the periphery of the display or by blurring the written word by squinting their eyes 
(both strategies participants reported using in informal debriefings).  
 
3.1.4 Procedure 
 The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except that in the speeded condition 
in addition to instructions emphasizing both response accuracy and speed in the sentence 
verification task, participants were told that each statement will appear for a short duration, 
and that the durations will be of variable times (this variability had the added benefit of 
deterring response strategies). The actual times (M = 3298ms, SD = 962ms; range 1605ms to 
6749ms) were determined through pre-testing (n = 15) as the average reading time plus two 
standard deviations of each statement. In the unspeeded condition the instructions 
emphasized response accuracy only and statements appeared until participants responded. In 
both conditions responses were collected via key presses (presented via E-Prime software). 
 
3.2 Results 
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3.2.1 Sentence response accuracy9 
As in Experiment 1, the primary hypothesis under test was that participants should be 
more accurate responding to items in which core intuitions are consistent with acquired 
beliefs in the domains of religion and science. The accuracy data were subjected to a 2 
(Domain; religion versus science) X 2 (Consistency; consistent versus inconsistent) X 2 
(Condition; time limit versus no time limit) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
repeated measures on the first two factors, revealing main effects of Domain (science versus 
religion; F 1, 69 = 480.2, p < .001, partial η
2 = .87), Consistency (consistent versus 
inconsistent; F 1, 69 = 576.4, p < .001, partial η
2 = .89), and Condition (F 1, 69 = 60.5, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .47), qualified by interactions between Domain and Consistency (F 1, 69 = 60.0, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .46) and Consistency and Condition (F 1, 69 = 4.8, p < .05, partial η
2 = 
.06). The interaction between Domain and Condition was not statistically significant (F 1, 69 = 
2.4, p = .123, partial η2 = .03), and the factors did not enter into a three-way interaction (F 1, 
69 = 2.7, p = .105, partial η
2 = .04). The interaction between Domain and Consistency is 
shown for both the unspeeded (no time limit) and speeded (time limit) conditions in Figure 3. 
 
                                                 
9 In the speeded (time limit) condition responses that were timed-out were considered incorrect. 
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Simple main effect analyses replicated the findings reported in Experiment 1 by 
confirming that participants performed better on the religion items than on the science items 
for both consistent (M religion = 93.37%, SD religion = 7.83% versus M science = 76.01%, SD science 
= 8.19%; t (70) = 14.92, p < .001, d = 2.17) and inconsistent items (M religion = 81.40%, SD 
religion = 12.87% versus M science = 52.68%, SD science = 9.25%; t (70) = 20.32, p < .001, d = 
2.56), and that the interaction between Domain and Consistency resulted from the size of the 
effect for consistency being more than twice as large for the science items (M consistent = 
76.01%, SD consistent = 8.19 %; versus M inconsistent = 52.68%, SD inconsistent = 9.25%; t (70) = 
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30.01, p < .001, d = 2.67) than for the religion items (M consistent = 93.37%, SD consistent = 
7.83%; versus M inconsistent = 81.40%, SD inconsistent = 12.87%; t (70) = 9.30, p < .001, d = 1.12). 
10 
 An examination of the mean differences, separated by condition, between consistent 
and inconsistent religion (M unspeeded = 5.67%, versus M speeded = 11.35%) and science (M 
unspeeded = 11.41%, versus M speeded = 12.13%) items revealed that the two-way interaction 
between Consistency and Condition was primarily carried by the religion items.11 The 
response accuracy data suggest that this was caused by a floor effect in responses to 
inconsistent science items in the time limit conditions (response accuracy on these items was 
approximately 50%, which is chance responding). 
                                                 
10 Shapiro-Wilk tests revealed that several of the response accuracy distributions were not normal (consistent 
and inconsistent religion items in the no time limit condition: SW = .731, df = 32, p < .001, SW = .872, df = 32, 
p = .001, respectively; consistent religion items and inconsistent science items in the time limit condition: SW = 
.874, df = 39, p < .001, SW = .941, df = 39, p < .05, respectively). The simple main effects were therefore 
analyzed with non-parametric tests to supplement the parametric tests reported here. A series of planned 
comparisons using the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test confirmed all findings reported here (all Zs < -6.67, all ps < 
.001). 
 
11 A separate examination of the religion and science items each via a 2 (Consistency; consistent versus 
inconsistent) X 2 (Condition; time limit versus no time limit) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
further confirmed that despite the absence of a three-way interaction the two-way interaction between 
Consistency and Condition was carried by the religion items (religion: F 1, 69 = 5.1, p < .05, partial η2 = .07; 
science: F 1, 69 = .22 p = n.s., partial η2 = .00). The results from this mixed ANOVA were additionally replicated 
with an Extended Linear-Mixed Effects Model, which accommodated different error-variances between the two 
Consistency factors (the error variance was greater for consistent than for inconsistent items in both Condition 
factors). The interaction for Consistency and Condition for the religion domain remained significant at p < 0.05. 
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 An analysis of the timed-out responses in the time limit condition further supports 
this interpretation. A 2 (Domain; religion versus science) X 2 (Consistency; consistent versus 
inconsistent) repeated-measures ANOVA with proportion of incorrect responses that were 
due to time-outs as the DV revealed main effects of Domain (F 1, 38 = 5.75, p < .05, partial η
2 
= .13) and Consistency (F 1, 38 = 15.48, p < .001, partial η
2 = .29) and no interaction. A larger 
number of incorrect responses on science items than on religion items were due to time-outs 
(M science = 25.60% versus M religion = 18.70%), and a larger number of incorrect responses on 
consistent items than on inconsistent items were due to time-outs (M consistent = 27.90% versus 
M inconsistent = 16.40%). A plausible interpretation of this pattern is that overall the science 
items were more difficult than the religion items, but since they were allowed approximately 
similar (or often shorter) responding durations, participants who tried to think about them for 
too long before responding were timed-out. In contrast, inconsistent items (particularly 
inconsistent science items) were significantly more difficult than consistent items, so much 
so that participants often chose an answer at random, causing faster response times and fewer 
time-outs. 
 
3.2.2 Sentence response time12 
Response time data for correct responses in the unspeeded condition only13 were 
entered into a 2 (Domain; religion versus science) X 2 (Consistency; consistent versus 
                                                 
12 A very small number of response time data points (<2%) were removed for being more than 3SD beyond the 
mean response time of any given participant. 
 
13 Response times in the speeded condition were truncated by the time limit manipulation and were therefore 
excluded from this analysis. 
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inconsistent) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), revealing a main effect of 
Consistency (F 1, 31 = 37.86, p < .001, partial η
2 = .55) and an interaction between Domain 
and Consistency (F 1, 31 = 21.98, p < .001, partial η
2 = .42). Simple main effect analyses 
revealed that the main effect of Consistency was carried by the science items (science: M 
consistent = 3176ms, SD consistent = 552ms versus M inconsistent = 3664ms, SD inconsistent = 613ms, t 
(31) = 9.22, p < .001, d = .84; religion: M consistent = 3277ms, SD consistent = 693ms versus M 
inconsistent = 3364ms, SD inconsistent = 563ms, t (31) = 1.21, p = n.s., d = .14), and that despite the 
lack of a main effect of Domain in the preceding analysis (F 1, 31 = 1.53, p = n.s., partial η
2 = 
.05) the response time for inconsistent religion items was significantly faster than for 
inconsistent science items (M religion = 3364ms, SD religion = 563ms versus M science = 3664ms, 
SD science = 613ms, t (31) = 3.36, p = .002, d = .51). The mean response times are shown in 
Figure 4. 
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3.2.3 Associations with measures of executive functions 
As in Experiment 1 the Stroop response time interference scores (M = -209ms, SD = 
119ms, for correct responses only) along with the working memory measure (M = 22.75, SD 
= 10.46) were entered into a correlational analysis with interference scores on accuracy (both 
conditions) and response time (no time limit condition only) on the sentence verification task 
for both the religion and science domains. Neither the inhibition nor the working memory 
measures were correlated with either the accuracy or response time interference scores for 
either the religion or science domains (all ps > n.s.). 
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3.2.4 Associations with measures of religious education14 
Two dichotomous measures of religious education were considered: regular monthly 
attendance at Church (66% of participants reported attending church at least once a month), 
and theology study (42% of participant reported having studied theology). A one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that regular monthly attendance at church did not 
predict either the accuracy or response time interference scores for religion items (all Fs < 
1.0, all ps = n.s.). However, as in Experiment 1, participants who regularly attended church 
were overall more accurate on both consistent (F 1, 69 = 12.82, p = .001, partial η
2 = .16) and 
inconsistent (F 1, 69 = 5.44, p < .05, partial η
2 = .07) religion items (M consistent = 89.06%, SD 
consistent = 9.81% versus M inconsistent = 95.57%, SD inconsistent = 5.52%). 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) additionally revealed that having studied 
theology predicted a smaller response time interference score for religion items (M religion = -
90ms, SD religion = 468ms versus M religion = 209ms, SD religion = 321ms; F 1, 30 = 4.62, p < .05, 
partial η2 = .13); it did not predict the accuracy interference score for religion items (F < 1.0, 
p = n.s.). 
 
4.0 Experiment 3 
The primary prediction of the current study whereby inconsistent statements should 
be responded to less accurately and more slowly than consistent statements was supported in 
                                                 
14 Associations with measures of math and science education weren’t examined in this experiment because there 
was not sufficient variability in this sample in the number of courses taken within the different math and science 
content areas. 
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Experiments 1-2. The goal of Experiment 3 was to control for the possibility that this pattern 
was caused by low-level biases in the statements used, rather than by co-existence and 
interference of core intuitions and acquired beliefs. For example, cognitive processing of the 
inconsistent statements within each group might have been systematically higher than that of 
the consistent statement as a result of their construction. To test this, in a subset of the 
religion statements in Experiment 3 the supernatural entity “God” was replaced with a non-
supernatural religious agent (“a priest”); it was predicted that since participants hold no 
acquired beliefs inconsistent with core intuitions about this non-supernatural agent there 
should be no differences in accuracy or in response time on the modified “inconsistent” and 
“consistent” (these terms were retained for ease of comparison) statements. 
 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants 
Participants were 37 university students (81% female) ranging in age from 18 to 21 
(M = 19) drawn from the psychology participant pool at a Southern California university. All 
participants received class credit for their time. Thirty eight percent of participants identified 
as White, 24% identified as Hispanic or Latino, 8% identified as black, 19% identified as 
Asian, and 11% identified as “Other”. 
As in experiments 1-2 all participants were pre-selected according to criteria meant to 
ensure primary exposure to and belief in only one religious tradition (see Experiment 1 for 
details). Four participants did not match these criteria, despite the initial pre-selection, and 
were therefore not included in the final sample (N = 33). 
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 Of the final sample thirty percent of participants identified as Roman Catholic, 37% 
identified as non-denominational Christian, and 33% identified as one of a number of 
Protestant Christian denominations (e.g. Methodist, Pentecostal). On a 4-point Likert scale 
(range 0 to 3) participants on average reported being moderately religious (M = 1.85, SD = 
.51) and moderately spiritual (M = 1.61, SD = .70), and the two were highly correlated (r = 
.44, p = .01). 
 
4.1.2 Design 
 As in Experiments 1-2 the primary dependent variable was response accuracy and a 
secondary dependent variable was response time. The design was a 2 (Domain: Religion 
versus Science) x 2 (Consistency: Consistent versus Inconsistent) factorial design with 
within-subjects repeated measures. 
 
4.1.3 Materials 
A subset of the religion statements (sets T3, T5, T6, T8, and T9 found in the 
Appendix) was modified by replacing the word “God” with “my priest”. The religion 
statements modified in this manner were not selected at random, but were selected because 
they could be modified and still remain coherent. For example, a number of statements could 
not be modified because they had to do with God listening to prayers, and prayers are 
directed toward God but not toward priests. Example statements appear in Table 2. 
The modified religion statements were presented in random order along with the 
unmodified religion statements (same as in Experiments 1-2) and the entire set of science 
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statements. No measures of executive functions or of education were administered in this 
experiment. 
 
 
 
4.1.4 Procedure 
 The procedure was the same as in Experiments 1-2, except that all participants were 
assigned to the same unspeeded condition (identical to the unspeeded condition in 
Experiment 2). 
 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Sentence response accuracy 
A paired-samples t-test on the 20 modified religion items revealed no differences in 
response accuracy between the modified “consistent” and “inconsistent” items (M consistent = 
77.30 %, SD consistent = 15.47%; versus M inconsistent = 73.90%, SD inconsistent = 18.53%; t (32) = 
.69, p > .5, d = .20). In contrast, a paired-samples t-test on these same unmodified items 
Table 2
Sample Modified Statements from the Domain of Religion.
Intuition Reflection Religion Statements Modified Religion Statements
Consistent
T T God has beliefs that are true. My priest has beliefs that are true.
F F All beliefs God has are false. All beliefs my priest has are false.
Inconsistent
T F God has beliefs that are false. My priest has beliefs that are false.
F T All beliefs God has are true. All beliefs my priest has are true.
Note. The terms "consistent" and "inconsistent" do not apply to the modified religion statements but are used for illustrative 
purposes only. The modified religion statements are true or false according to intuition only.
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(using the “God” rather than “my priest”) from the no time limit condition from Experiment 
2 revealed a difference between consistent and inconsistent items in response accuracy (M 
consistent = 96.60 %, SD consistent = 5.45%; versus M inconsistent = 88.70%, SD inconsistent = 13.62%; t 
(31) = 3.14, p < .01, d = .76). 
Next, to examine if the main findings from Experiments 1-2 replicated in the 28 
unmodified religion items the response accuracy data were subjected to a 2 (Domain; religion 
versus science) X 2 (Consistency; consistent versus inconsistent) repeated measures analysis 
of variance (ANOVA),. The analysis revealed main effects of Domain (science versus 
religion; F 1, 32 = 195.41, p < .001, partial η
2 = .86) and Consistency (consistent versus 
inconsistent; F 1, 32 = 307.20, p < .001, partial η
2 = .91) qualified by an interaction between 
Domain and Consistency (F 1, 32 = 53.23, p < .001, partial η
2 = .62). 
Simple main effect analyses confirmed that as in Experiments 1-2 participants 
performed better on the religion items than on the science items in both the consistent (M 
religion = 97.19%, SD religion = 6.67% versus M science = 81.61%, SD science = 5.66%; t (32) = 
10.78, p < .001, d = 2.52) and inconsistent conditions (M religion = 85.06%, SD religion = 9.68% 
versus M science = 57.61%, SD science = 7.82%; t (32) = 13.77, p < .001, d = 3.12). The 
interaction entailed the size of the effect for consistency being more than twice as large for 
the science items (M consistent = 81.61%, SD consistent = 5.66%; versus M inconsistent = 57.61%, SD 
inconsistent = 7.82%; t (32) = 19.18, p < .001, d = 3.52) than for the religion items (M consistent = 
97.19%, SD consistent = 6.67%; versus M inconsistent = 85.06%, SD inconsistent = 9.68%; t (32) = 
8.83, p < .001, d = 1.46). 
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4.2.2 Sentence response time15 
A paired-samples t-test on correct responses on the 20 modified religion items 
revealed no differences between the modified “consistent” and “inconsistent” items in 
response time (M consistent = 3770ms, SD consistent = 1178ms; versus M inconsistent = 3541ms, SD 
inconsistent = 992ms; t (32) = .96, p = n.s., d = .21). A paired-samples t-test on correct responses 
on the unmodified versions of these 20 items from the no time limit condition from 
Experiment 2 similarly revealed no difference between consistent and inconsistent items (M 
consistent = 3277ms, SD consistent = 693ms; versus M inconsistent = 3364ms, SD inconsistent = 563ms; t 
(31) = 1.21, p = n.s., d = .14). However, response time means on consistent versus 
inconsistent items were in the predicted direction for the unmodified items and in the 
opposite direction for the modified items. This pattern of findings, along with the response 
accuracy findings mentioned in section 4.2.1, suggests that the reference to a supernatural 
agent (“God”) in the items used in this series of experiments is critical in causing the effect 
of consistency observed; the effect is not caused by any idiosyncratic features of inconsistent 
items, or other differences between consistent and inconsistent items. 
Next, response time data on correct responses on the 28 unmodified religion items 
were subjected to a 2 (Domain; religion versus science) X 2 (Consistency; consistent versus 
inconsistent) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). The analysis revealed main 
effects of Domain (science versus religion; F 1, 32 = 7.44, p = .01, partial η
2 = .19) and 
Consistency (consistent versus inconsistent; F 1, 32 = 68.12, p < .001, partial η
2 = .68) 
                                                 
15 A very small number of response time data points (<2%) were removed for being more than 3SD beyond the 
mean response time of any given participant. 
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qualified by an interaction between Domain and Consistency (F 1, 32 = 8.36, p < .01, partial η
2 
= .21). 
Simple main effect analyses revealed that as in Experiments 1-2 participants were 
faster on the science items than on the religion items for consistent items (M science = 2991ms, 
SD science = 632ms versus M religion = 3284ms, SD religion = 715ms; t (32) = 3.99, p < .001, d = 
.43), and that there was no difference in response time on the science and religion items for 
inconsistent items (M religion = 3576ms, SD religion = 791ms versus M science = 3538ms, SD science 
= 779ms t (32) = .49, p = n.s., d = .05). The interaction entailed the size of the effect for 
consistency being nearly twice as large for the science items (M consistent = 2991ms, SD consistent 
= 632ms; versus M inconsistent = 3538ms, SD inconsistent = 779ms; t (32) = 9.19, p < .001, d = .77) 
than for the religion items (M consistent = 3284ms, SD consistent = 715ms; versus M inconsistent = 
3576ms, SD inconsistent = 791ms; t (32) = 3.91, p < .001, d = .39). 
 
5.0 General discussion 
5.1 Support for the co-existence of inconsistent acquired beliefs and core intuitions 
The goal of the current study was to investigate the hypothesis according to which 
acquired religious beliefs inconsistent with evolved core intuitions co-exist with, rather than 
replace, those intuitions in the minds of religious believers, using the case of Christian beliefs 
about God. The experiments reported here utilized a sentence verification task where 
participants were required to evaluate as true or false statements that were either consistent or 
inconsistent on core intuitions (or early-acquired) and (later) acquired religious (or scientific) 
beliefs. In Experiments 1-2 participants were less accurate and slower in evaluating 
inconsistent versus consistent statements, supporting our first prediction of an interference of 
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core intuitions on acquired religious beliefs (or early-acquired on later-acquired scientific 
beliefs), and thereby both the co-existence and co-option hypotheses. 
By replacing the term “God” with “a priest” in a subset of the statements in 
Experiment 3 we controlled for the possibility that the findings in Experiments 1-2 were 
caused by low-level biases in the statements used, rather than by co-existence and 
interference of core intuitions and acquired religious beliefs. 
Additionally, the experiments reported here utilized a novel methodology which 
controls for alternative interpretations whereby attributing person-like characteristics to God 
is caused by individuals not having acquired the relevant theology16 or by intentional 
deviations from theology. 
As discussed in the introduction, one alternative interpretation of previous findings is 
that it is not clear that all participants fully know which characteristics God is assumed to 
have. In this study all theological beliefs pertaining to the physical and psychological 
characteristics of God chosen to construct the statements  used were ones that would be 
known to most if not all religious and non-religious Western adults. The very high 
                                                 
16 This methodology also controlled for an alternative interpretation whereby some participants adhered to a 
theological doctrine which invalidates the use of this task altogether. For example, the doctrine of negative 
theology postulates that due to the transcendent essence of God it is only appropriate to describe God by 
negation: that is, it is only appropriate to describe what God is not, rather than what God is. According to this 
view any statement about, for instance, the beliefs God has (whether true or false) is false. In this task, however, 
consistent statements were a baseline against which inconsistent statements were evaluated; the conclusions 
made are in the difference between the two statement sets, not in their appropriateness with respect to one 
theological tradition or another. More so, the near perfect response accuracy for our consistent statements 
confirmed our assumption that the participants in our study adhered to standard theological doctrines. 
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performance on inconsistent religion statements and near perfect performance on consistent 
religion statement suggests that the theological beliefs chosen were indeed known to the 
participants tested.17 
Additionally, an examination of response accuracies on individual religion statements 
(see the Appendix) shows that for the most part errors are relatively evenly distributed among 
the different statements; that is, there was a small but reliable probability that participants 
would make an error on any given statement regardless of the characteristic the statement 
pertained to. The alternative whereby participants did not know certain parts of the relevant 
theology predicts clustering of errors around only few statements, for example statements 
pertaining to characteristics of God talked about rarely, and/or ambiguously. 
Another alternative interpretation of previous findings is that while representations of 
God co-opt the person concept abstract theological characteristics do replace default 
inferences about persons in those representations, but believers then intentionally deviate 
from theology by attributing person-like characteristics to God. The response time data in 
both the speeded and unspeeded instructions conditions of Experiment 1 and the no time 
limit condition of Experiment 2 control for this alternative interpretation of the response 
accuracy data: as predicted by the view whereby attributing person, rather than theological, 
characteristics to God is the intuitive default, consistent religion statements were responded 
to more quickly than inconsistent religion statements. If abstract theological characteristics 
                                                 
17 Whether or not participants had sufficient access to the relevant scientific information across the domains 
tested in Shtulman & Valcarcel (2012) remains a potential concern, however, since both in their study and in 
our replication accuracy for some items was as low as would be expected from chance (e.g. less than 50% for 
inconsistent statements in the domains of ‘evolution’ and ‘mechanics’). 
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replace default inferences about persons, and person-like characteristics are only 
intentionally and consciously applied, then among correct responses – those responses where 
person-like characteristics would not have been applied – there should be no difference in 
response times between different statement kinds. 
The response accuracy data in the time limit condition of Experiment 2 additionally 
control for this alternative. As predicted by the co-existence hypothesis, when participants 
were given the task with a time limit on responses they disproportionately made more errors 
on inconsistent versus consistent religion statements. The alternative predicts that under time 
limit conditions there should be an equal decrease in response accuracies in the different 
statement kinds. 
 
5.2 Support for a mechanism that resolves conflicts between inconsistent beliefs 
If core intuitions co-exist and interfere with inconsistent acquired beliefs then certain 
mechanisms should exist to resolve the interference or conflict created by tasks in which both 
representations are engaged (e.g. Kelemen & Rossett, 2009; Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston, 
2012; Lindeman, Reikki & Hood, 2011; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013). Therefore, a second 
prediction derived from the co-existence hypothesis which was tested here was that the effect 
of consistency on response accuracy will increase when participants are made less able to 
resolve conflicts between inconsistent beliefs. 
In Experiment 2 a subset of participants was assigned to a speeded responding 
condition where a time limit was set on responses, and another subset received the task with 
no such time limit (unspeeded responding condition). The findings demonstrated that when 
participants are made to respond quickly they disproportionately make more errors on 
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inconsistent versus consistent religion statements.  This supports the prediction that certain 
cognitive mechanisms resolve conflicts between inconsistent beliefs, and that when 
individuals are put under time pressure these mechanisms are less able to do so. 
  
5.3 No correlations with executive inhibition 
A third prediction derived from the co-existence hypothesis which was tested here 
was that executive inhibition, as indexed by the behavioral Stroop task, is the process that 
resolves the interference or conflict of core intuitions on inconsistent acquired beliefs. 
Previous studies are equivocal in their support for this proposal. For example, on the one 
hand Kelemen & Rossett (2009) found that performance with a subset of teleological 
statements was related to the behavioral Stroop task, with the task explaining unique variance 
in endorsement performance (ibid, p. 141), and similarly, Svedholm & Lindeman (2013) 
showed that a measure of ontological confusion (argued by these authors to be based on core 
intuitions, and to underlie paranormal belief) was strongly correlated with the behavioral 
Stroop task (albeit using a different configuration of task conditions and coding than those 
used by Kelemen & Rossett, 2009). On the other hand, Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston (2012) 
found no relationship between teleological thinking based errors and the behavioral Stroop 
task in their study of college students, professional scientists and community members (ibid, 
p. 1079). 
The results reported here using task conditions and coding similar to those adopted by 
Kelemen and colleagues in Experiment 1, and Svedholm & Lindeman (2013) in Experiment 
2, repeatedly failed to show a relationship between performances on the sentence verification 
task and inhibitory control, further muddying the pattern of results on this question. We think 
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it likely that this failure to find a correlation between performance on the sentence 
verification task and the behavioral Stroop task is due to the fact that on the one hand, 
executive inhibition itself can be measured in a variety of ways and that, more broadly, a 
range of different executive functions may jointly contribute to the coordination of different 
kinds of representations (e.g. Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000). In 
future researchers might consider the use of a more rigorous battery of inhibitory and other 
executive functions measures to evaluate more precisely the ways in which executive 
functions (and specifically inhibition) might be involved in coordinating conflicting core 
intuitions and acquired beliefs.   
 
5.4 No correlations with practice 
 A final prediction derived from the co-existence hypothesis which was tested here 
was that practice with acquired religious and scientific beliefs would attenuate interference 
from inconsistent intuitions. The failure to find such an effect in both the domains of religion 
and science in the current study parallels that of Shtulman & Valcarcel (2012) for science. In 
contrast, the investigation by Kelemen & Rosset (2009) of intuitive teleological thinking 
about natural phenomena in a similar population of university undergraduates did find an 
effect of science education (as indexed by questionnaires on geoscience and natural 
selection) on implicit teleological errors. Furthermore, the investigation by Goldberg & 
Thompson-Schill (2009) of animacy judgments in biology professors versus university 
undergraduates found such an effect, with the biology professors showing a smaller bias in 
preferentially ascribing animacy to animals than to plants (also see Kelemen, Rottman, & 
Seston, 2012). 
 42 
 
 Is variability in the strength of acquired beliefs, then, associated with variable 
susceptibility to interference from core intuitions? The studies by Kelemen and colleagues 
and the study by Goldberg & Thompson-Schill (2009) all used more nuanced indices of 
variability in acquired beliefs than the ones used in the current study (or in the study by 
Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012); however, their findings are equivocal. Goldberg & Thompson-
Schill (2009) find greater animacy judgments for animals versus plants in biology professors 
versus undergraduates, but not for other categories less studied in biology departments (e.g. 
nonliving natural kinds versus artifacts). This suggests that the strength of acquired beliefs, 
rather than another difference between the groups examined, can explain the difference in 
animacy judgements. On the other hand, while Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston (2012) 
demonstrated that the tendency to make teleological errors was greater in undergraduates 
than in science professors, they did not find such a difference between science and 
humanities professors. In future researchers might consider the use of more nuanced indexes 
and combinations of multiple indexes (both questionnaires as in Kelemen & Rosset, 2009, 
and populations that more strongly differ in education or practice as in Kelemen, Rottman, & 
Seston, 2012, and Goldberg & Thompson-Schill, 2009) to further investigate questions 
pertaining to the effects of practice on acquired beliefs which are inconsistent with intuitions. 
 
5.5 Future directions 
5.5.1 What concept is being co-opted? 
In this study we assumed that the person concept is co-opted to form a representation 
of God. However, other concepts could be co-opted for this function. For example, Shtulman 
& Lindeman (2015) argue that a disembodied mind concept, rather than a person concept, is 
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being co-opted in forming representations of God and other supernatural entities; Cohen 
(2007, 2008) proposed that among believers of the Afro-Brazilian syncretic cult Candomblé 
some beliefs about possessing spirits co-opt mechanisms for reasoning about pathogens. 
More so, it is possible that there are individual differences in the core concept that is co-
opted for forming a representation of a given supernatural entity. Future studies are needed to 
further investigate which concepts are being co-opted to form representations of various 
supernatural entities in both mainstream Christianity and other religious groups.  
 
5.5.2 “On-the-ground” phenomena 
The co-existence hypothesis explains two “on-the-ground” phenomena which might 
otherwise seem mysterious to social scientists and humanists (see Sperber, 1985, for an early 
discussion): a discrepancy between the different beliefs a given individual reports regarding 
the same religious or scientific phenomenon, and a discrepancy between a given individual’s 
reported beliefs on the one hand, and behavior on the other (also see Slone, 2004). For 
example, Christian religious believers often simultaneously describe God as both person-like 
(e.g. loving, fallible) and abstract (not able to be described with human emotion terms and 
infallible), and although God is theologically believed to be all-knowing Christian religious 
believers nonetheless tell Him their wishes (the contradiction, of course, is that if God is all-
knowing believers do not need to tell Him anything – He already knows everything). Future 
studies are needed to further investigate the conditions in which different beliefs are 
verbalized “on-the-ground”, and the role of core intuitions and acquired beliefs in regulating 
behavior. 
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